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The purpose of this paper is to present the ideas of 
Karl Rahner on ~he subject of dogma and dogmatic development. 
In doing so we will begin by briefly discussing some aspects 
of Rahner's anthropology and ontology and then progress to 
the relationship of these subjects to revelation and dogma. 
Karl Rahner has had a great influence on modern 
theology for many years. It is not surprising then that we 
turn to him for ideas on how to solve the Catholic dilemma 
of how doctrine must remain immutable while it apparently 
changes due to the forces of history. These ideas have been 
available to theologians in the United States for a number 
of years. However, Rahner's thought, although systematic in 
its scope, is not always systematic in its presentation. 
Bits and pieces of ideas, especially on the subject of dogma, 
are found scattered among his many writings, which include 
books and an amazing number of articles. The goal of this 
author is not to uncover ideas of Rahner's which have been 
hidden or unavailable until now, but to gather Rahner's 
thoughts from his many works and present them in a coherent 
whole so that their systematic relationship to one another 
may be seen. It is hoped that such a presentation will be 
1 
2 
of use to the reader in making Rahner's positions concerning 
dogma and doctrinal development more clear and more acces-
sible. 
CHAPTER II 
ONTOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
In this chapter we will briefly consider some as-
pects of Rahner's ontology. It may seem strange for us to 
begin this way in a paper primarily dealing with Rahner's 
theories of dogmatic development. Actually this is the 
most logical way to begin. Any concern with dogma must 
deal in some way with revelation and revelation is God 
speaking to man. In briefly describing Rahner's ontology 
and anthropology we will attempt to answer the questions 
of what is God, that he should speak to man and what is 
man that he can hear God's word. 
Rahner begins his inquiry into both Being and man's 
transcendence towards Being by analyzing the nature of a 
metaphysical question. Man is the being who necessarily 
asks questions about Being 
Man cannot abstain from answering the question about 
being; an answer is always forthcoming, because the 
question belongs always and necessarily to man's exis-
tence. Always and of necessity man posits in his exis-
tence the 'Whence' for an answer, hence implicitly the 
question of being itself. 1 
1Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, trans. Joseph 
Donceel, p. 27. 
3 
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The question about being does not, however, simply 
tell us about man only. It also reveals some of the charac-
teristics of Being itself. 
In the metaphysical question about being we enquire first 
about all being as such. This implies that the nature of 
being i~ to know and be known in an original unity. We 2 
shall call this the self-presence or luminosity of being. 
This luminosity of being is the basis of Rahner's 
ontology. Every being, given its characteristic as a possi-
ble object of knowledge, has an essential orientation to pos-
sible knowledge and therefore to a possible knower. This or-
ientation is true of every being simply due to the fact that 
it participates in being; that it exists. 
3 
and knowing form an original unity • 
Therefore being 
• • being means a knowledge that returns into itself, 
hence self-presence, reflection upon oneself, that is 
luminous in itself and for itself. 4 
This self-luminosity corresponds to the degree to 
which a particular being participates in being. The inten-
sity of the existence of a being determines the degree of 
its self-presence. 5 This relationship also works in the 
other direction. A being's degree of self-presence indi-
6 
cates the degree to which it has being. 
2 29-30. Ibid. , pp. 
3 31. Ibid., p. 
4 37. Ibid. , p. 
5 Ibid. , p. 39. 
6 Ibid., p. 110. 
5 
Equating being with self-presence can seem to unnec-
essarily limit the scope of existence, particularly as we 
experience our own human. existence as a richer, complex af-
fair. Rahner acknowledges this point but responds that even 
this complex1ty can be reduced to his elements of knowledge 
and existence. 
Sure, being is more than knowledge, it is life and ac-
tion, decision and execution; but it is all this in such 
a way that all life and action, every decision and exe-
cution, insofar as they are (and insofar as they are not, 
they are nothing), are luminous for themselves, are self-
present in knowledge, because, although they differ con-
ceptually from knowledge, they are moments that belong 
intrinsically to being itself, to being that is self-
present in its luminosity in all the dimensions in which 
it unfolds its nature. 7 
Even if all this has convinced us that being is self-
presence or luminosity, we might raise a further objection. 
As existing men and women we participate in being. If being 
is so self-present why do we have to inquire about it. We 
must inquire about our own being even while we participate 
in it. Rahner's answer to this is that we must inquire into 
our existence, and existence in general, because the inner 
core of our being is finite. As human beings we participate 
in both being and non-being. Therefore our limited degree 
of being provides us only with an imperfect glimpse of the 
self-luminosity of being itself. We see enough to ask the 
question but cannot realize the full reality about which we 
7 Ibid., pp. 35-6. 
6 
8 
inquire. In this scheme being and self-presence can be 
seen as fluid, part of a process undergoing "continual inner 
transformations" in particular beings as they participate in 
9 
varying degrees of being and non-being. 
Only the pure act of being is the absolute identity of 
being and knowing, and perfectly realizes what is meant 
by the concept of being. In this case of an absolute 
identity of being and knowing in the pure act of being, 
in the aBsolute Being, there remain no more questions 
to be asked. 10 
Therefore only absolute Being affords pure luminos-
ity; "Being, hence above all pure Being, is light and there 
11 
is no darkness in it." 
In addition to luminosity, Being-in-itself is per-
sonal. This is shown by the fact that contingent beings, 
such as ourselves, are held in existence. Contingent be-
ings can only be held in existence by an act of will on 
the part of Being. We cannot deny that this is so or we 
would be denying our own existence. Being becomes personal 
in virtue of its ability for voluntary affirmation • 
• the volitional necessarx positing of something 
contingent, as it occurs in man's ·affirmation of his 
own existence, can only be understood if we affirm it 
as posited by a free voluntary act. Man is necessar-
ily posited, bee~ he is posited by a free will. 
We necessarily posit a contingent reality absolutely 
8 38. Ibid., p. 
9 Ibid., p. 42. 
10 Ibid. 
11 rbid., p. 4 3. 
7 
while in the same breath affirming the luminosity of 
being. This makes sense only if, by doing so, we ra-
tify and endorse the act by which this contingent being 
has been freely and absolutely posited as absolute. 
This free, voluntary, original positing of the being 
that man is (for we are thinking of him in all our con-
siderations) r~n only be the work of the absolute be-
ing, of _God. 
Now th~t Rahner has shown that man stands before 
God's free act, it remains to show how such free acts of. 
God mi~ht be luminous or accessible to man. First of all, 
13 
a free act of pure Being shares in the luminosity of Being, 
for as we recall, being and knowledge exist in inseparable 
unity. This is because, 
• a free act is originally not so much the positing 
of something else, of something external, of some effect 
which is distinct from and opposed to the free act it-
self. It is rather the fulfillment of one's own nature, 
a taking possession of oneselfJ of the reality of one's 
own creative power over oneself. Thus ii 4 is a coming 
to oneself, a self-presence in oneself. 
Any free act of pure Being may be luminous due to 
its participation in the nature of Being. But Rahner goes 
beyond this and says that any act which proceeds from God 
must be love, especially as this act is directed toward a 
contingent object • 
• • the finite has its ground in the free, luminous 
act of God. Now a free self-present act is love. For 
love is the luminous will aiming at the person in its 
irreducible unicity. It is precisely such a will that 
12 75. Ibid. , p. 
13 86. Ibid., p. 
14 85. Ibid., p. 
8 
God sets in action when he creates a finite being. It 
is his way of loving himself in his free, creative power. 
Thus the contingent is understood in God's love and only 
in it. 15 
If the contingent is not seen to be affirmed in be-
ing and made- luminous through the free love of God, it may 
erroneously be· seen as being necessary, or unintelligible. 
Being could then only be seen as an abyss, out of which no 
glimmer of light or knowledge could shine. 16 
God, then, is understood as luminous, directed to 
a possible knower, possessing will and capable of free and 
voluntary action directed in love toward contingent beings. 
For Rahner the philosophical term Being is identified with 
the theological term God. This is a God capable of reveal-
ing himself to man. 
Now we will examine revelation from the viewpoint 
of man. What is man that makes it possible for him to hear 
a revelation from God if in fact such a revelation should 
occur? Man questions being; his own being, the being of 
others and Being in general. The fact· that man questions 
being can reveal the basic structure of man's knowing and 
his relation to the objects of his knowledge. The ques-
tioning itself tells us something about man's relation to 
being. A question can only be asked if that which is in-
15 Ibid., p. 86. 
16Ibid., 86 7 pp. - • 
9 
quired about is at the same time known and unknown. If we 
inquire about being this implies that we have enough partial 
knowledge of it, from our provisional knowledge of beings in 
general, to begin an inquiry; and that being is at the same 
17 time so hidden from us that we must question what it is. 
How does man become aware of this knowable yet par-
tially hidden being? It is through the process of abstrac-
tion. Knowledge, which is self-presence, begins with a sub-
ject going out of itself to an object and then returning to 
itself. The subject's awareness of its return to self con-
stitutes it as a knower who is able to separate himself from 
18 This ability to abstract is the object of his knowledge. 
a transcendental condition for the possibility of knowledge 
or thought. Rahner identifies it with what Thomistic epis-
19 
temology calls the agent intellect. 
Besides establishing the knower as subjectt abstrac-
tion is the ability to grasp that the quiddity of the indi-
vidual object is illimited; that it could possibly be a de-
termination of other objects besides the particular object 
with which we are currently faced. Thus no object is con-
sidered only in itself but is dealt with by the human sub-
20 ject within the range of all possible objects. Abstrac-
17 Ibid., p. 38. 
18 Ibid., p. 35. 
l9Ibid., p. 49. 
20rbid., pp. 1~9-50. 
10 
tion makes possible the development of the subject as subject 
in an activity which Rahner calls judgment: the incorporation, 
comparison, contrast etc., of individual objects of knowledge 
21 
under that which we call concepts. 
And this grasping of the single ob1ect under the concept 
(the knowled~e of the object as possessing the universal 
quiddity mentioned by the statement's predicate) is but 
the other side of what we have called the self-subsis-
tence in knowledge of the knowing human subject. For it 
is precisely because through his concept the knowing sub-
ject knows something of something, because he can refer 
his universal concept to a this to which it applies, 
that he opposes this this to himself as his object and 
thus reaches his knowing self-subsistence. 22 
What, however, pushes the human subject beyond the 
individual object of knowledge? If an object is grasped as 
limited it is only because there is something which is try-
23 ing to get beyond it. 
This is possible only if the activity which grasps this 
individual sense object reaches out prior to this grasp-
ing, beyond 2 ~his individual object, for more than the latter is. 
Rahner calls this driving force behind the human in-
tellect the Vorgriff. The Vorgriff is what makes abstrac-
tion possible. It allows for the individual object to be 
grasped within the universal concept, or abstracted. In 
this way man's self-subsistence as a subject becomes 
21 Ibid., P• 49. 
22 Ibid., p • l,8. 
23 Ibid., p. so. 
24 Ibid. 
11 
25 possible. The Vorgriff does this by pointing to a "more" 
beyond the present object of knowledge. 
Now this 'more' can obviously not be a single object of 
the same kind as the one whose abstracting knowledge it 
is supposed to make possible. Otherwise the same ques-
tion would come up again. This 'more' can only be the 
absolute range of all knowable objects as such. We shall 
call this 'reach for more' the Yorgriff. 2~ 
As mentioned above the Vorgriff in itself cannot be 
an object of knowledge. Man can become aware of this "reach 
for more" only with the knowledge of the single object. 27 
The subject then becomes aware of the Vorgriff, not as a 
thing, but rather as a horizon within which the object of 
man's 
28 
thought can be known. The Vorgriff tends toward 
being itself and therefore can include all individual beings 
within its horizon. 
It is the dynamism of the spirit as it strives towards 
the absolute range of all possible objects. In this 
movement of the mind the single objects are grasped as 
single stages of this finality. 29 
The Vorgriff's drive to the infinite implies the 
existence of an absolute Being. Through the unlimited range 
of the \l.orgriff absolute Being is affi.rmed. At the same 
time this absolute Being is affirmed as real because the 
25Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 51. 
28 Ibid. 
12 
Vorgriff tends toward real being as its horizon and not merely 
i 3n poss ble being. Since man's transcendence toward being 
provides the condition of all thought and action within our 
world, this reaching out for the absolute, which only God can 
satisfy, is not simply one human characteristic among others. 
Because of the y~rgriff man stands before God essentially in 
every aspect of his existence. 31 To be human at all is to 
stand before God, with God as the horizon within which all 
acts of human life occur. To be human is to be a transcen-
dent spirit. 
Man constantly stands within the horizon of being as 
such. Yet, as was mentioned above, he inquires about it. 
Therefore God, as absolute being, is not transparent to us. 
We can know of God only through those finite objects which 
the Vorgriff makes accessible to our mode of knowing. 
The absolute transcendence of man as a spirit would re-
veal the infinite. But this infinity of being stands 
revealed only in the illimited range of the Vorgriff. 
Now this Vorgriff does not represent the infinite in 
himself, it only co-affirms him as.the ultimate where-
unto of the illimited dynamism of the spirit that we 
call the Vorgriff. On the other hand the Vorgriff oc-
curs and we know about it only as the condition of the 
possibility of conceptual knowledge of finite objects. 
It seems to follow that we know of 32od's infinity only in connection with finite beings. 
30 Ibid., p. 55. 
31 Ibid., P• 58. 
32 Ibid., p. 63. 
13 
Man only knows God through negation, as something 
more than his individual objects of knowledge and not as 
simply another object of knowledge. Therefore this hidden-
ness implies that a further revelation to man would be mean-
ingful. There is still something to be revealed by God to 
man. 33 Graci is also possible. 
The only requirement for this • . is that the objec-
tive openness of man's natural transcendence should not 
from the start anticigate all possible objects of revela-
tion as due to man. 3 
And man, in his voluntary affirmation of his own ex-
istence, takes up a free attitude toward God. In his very 
question concerning being, he affirms his existence as both 
contingent and necessary. 
Insofar as he must inquire he affirms his own finite 
'thrownness', insofar as he must inouire, he affirms 
it necessarily. And as he affirms it necessarily, he 
affirms his existence in and despite its thrownness, 
as unconditioned, as absolute. • It is only in 
this necessity of a conscious relation to the non-
necessary that man is the transcendence towards being 
that is luminous and affirmed as such. 35 
Man's necessary affirmation of his contingent being 
makes him aware that his existence is maintained by the 
free power of absolute Being. In this way he becomes aware 
of Being as person; as capable of volition and affirmation. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 60. 
35 Ibid., p. 73. 
14 
He cannot now relate to Being as if it were some kind of 
flat, inanimate idenl. He now faces Being as something that 
disposes of man in freedom. 36 Being is seen as person and 
therefore can relate to man in interactions possible only 
between free autonomous beings. Through man's voluntary at-
37 titude toward himself, being has opened up for him. 
Man necessarily affirms the luminosity of being because 
he necessarily assumes an affirmative stance toward him-
self, because, even when in thought or in action he says 
NO to himself, he still affirms himself as being, because 
in the very act of such a denial he still presupposes him-
self as the possible object of such an act, hence as be-
ing. But in such a necessary attitude towards himself 
man affirms himself as finite, as contingent, as fortui-
tous. Insofar as he affirms himself necessarily, his 
existence is for man, despite and in its contingency, 
something unavoidable, which he has to take up, in that 
sense something ahsolute. nespite its contingency it 
is not submitted to the decision of the finite being, 
to his choice between Yes and No; it raises an absolute 
claim to acceptance, it demands to be accepted and des-
pite its contingency it has always already imposed this 
acceptance. 38 
When we love the free act of God we can enter into 
its origin and generation. Therefore love is the "light of 
knowledge." And since our direct knowledge can only be of 
finite things (for only through these can we come to love 
and, through negation, to know the infinite), all knowledge 
" " 
39 Man is therefore, is the luminous radiance of love. 
36Ibid., p. 75. 
37rhid., p. 81. 
38Ibid., p. 82. 
39 Ibid., p. 87. 
15 
caught up in love, to the extent that he truly knows or under-
stands anything • 
• at the heart of the finite spirit's transcendence 
there lives a love for God. Man's openness towards ab-
solute being is carried by the affirmation of his own 
existence. This affirmation is a voluntary attitude of 
man with-regard to himself and, in final analysis, a 
reaching out of finite love for God, because, as love 
of the spirit, it can affirm the finite only as carried 
by God's affirmation of his own being. This implies 
that man's standing before God through knowledge (which 
constitutes man's nature as spirit) possesses as an in-
ner movement of this knowledge a love for God in him-
self. Man's love for God is not something which may 
or may not happen, once man has come to know God. As 
an innermost moment of knowledge it is both its condi-
tion and its ground. 40 
Man may be oriented essentially towards the love of 
God, but how is he to remain a being capable of voluntary 
affirmation while maintaining the freedom which makes voli-
tion possible? The answer lies in the range of man's possi-
ble responses to Goo's love. Man's transcendence provides 
the essential framework for his existence. He is spirit. 
However, as a free being, capable of acts of will and affir-
mation, man retains the capacity to act contrary to his most 
basic orientation. He can choose not to respond with love 
to God's own expression of love. Because there is a possi-
bility of affirming or not affirming being; being exists for 
41 
man as the absolute value. This in turn allows man to 
establish an order of values within the range of the absolute 
value. 
40 Ibid., p. 88. 
41 Ibid., P• 90. 
16 
• in the awareness of values, the spirit, in its 
transcendence towards the absolute value, knows of the 
finiteness of the single values which it encounters and 
knows itself as actively self-subsisting with respect 
to such values, i.e. as endowed with freedom. In the 
affirmation of a value it is subject to necessity, and 
in this sense not free, only to the extent that the af-
firmation belongs to the conditions of the spirit's 
necessary openness to value as such. 42 
Because man is free to choose among values he can 
take a basic stance in his life toward absolute value. But 
just as man was brought to some awareness of the infinite 
through his knowledge of finite objects; in the same way, 
man's attitude toward God as absolute value results from 
his choice among the finite values available to him. His 
choices affect him to the extent that he becomes what he 
chooses in his daily existence, becoming good or evil ac-
cording to what he chooses or rejects. 43 
Man does not first know God in a 'neutral' way and after-
wards decide whether he will love or hate him. • The 
concrete way in which man knows God is from the start de-
termined by the way man loves and values the things that 
come his way •••• Thus every man has the God who corres-44 ponds to his commitment and the nature of this commitment. 
Rahner, in viewing man as a transcendent hearer of 
God's word proceeds from man's natural transcendence, not to 
any supernatural knowledge, but to "an analysis of man's ca-
pacity of hearing God's revelation, a capacity which makes 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., pp. 91-2. 
44 Ibid., PP• 92-3. 
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45 Man's capacity to listen to of him a real human being." 
·God is a "potency" which does not demand its object hut which 
may "be addressed by this object and invited to obey its call 
46 (obedientia)." Rahner feels that his task, in view of his 
previously discusserl anthropology, is to show how man's essen-
tial transcendental make-up gives him a positive capacity for 
an eventual divine revelation, without making it necessary 
that "the content of this revelation is only the objective 
1 f i II 47 corre ate o this openness and may be determined by t. 
A revelation which is to unveil the depths of Divinity 
and which is basically the first moment of the invita-
tion addressed to man to share in the life of almighty 
God himself, is conceivable and possible only if man 
is understood as sryirit, i.e. as transcendence towards 
being pure and simple. A more restricted horizon of 
human knowledge would at once a priori drive possible 
contents of a revelation outside t~gs horizon and render 
them incapable of being revealed. 
Since the horizon of possible beings which the spirit 
can attain to in its transcendence can extend in principle 
beyond all available objects of knowledge, limited only in 
that it cannot obtain the direct vision of absolute being 
or God, it is possible for man to accept any communication 
which God may freely decide to bestow on man. 49 A divine 
45 Ibid., p. 7. 
46Ibid., p. 16. 
4 7Ibid., PP• 20-21. 
48Ibid., p • 57. 
49 Ihid., p. 7 7. 
18 
communication is not, however, made necessary by man's abil-
ity to accept such a communication. 
Since at the same time and for the same reason that he 
stands before God, he stands also before the God of a 
possible revelation, there always occurs something like 
a revelation, namely the speaking or the silence of God. 
And man always and naturally hears the word or the si-
lence of t~e free absolute God. Otherwise he would not 
be spirit. Spirit does not mean a demand that God should 
speak, but 0 should he not speak, the spirit hears God's silence. 5 
It is only in this metaphysical sense that revelation 
can be necessary while remaining free; "For revelation in the 
theological sense does not consist in God's free choice be-
tween manifesting or shrouding himself; it is the actual mani-
festation of his hidden essence." 51 
If God, in his supreme freedom, chose not to reveal him-
self, but to remain shrouded in silence, man would reach 
the peak of his spiritual and Slligious existence by lis-
tening to the silence of God. 
Up to this point we have been emphasizing God's free-
dom to manifest himself to man if he wishes, or to remain 
silent. Man also has a freedom with regard to revelation. 
Although it is part of man's basic mak~-up to be open to a 
possible revelation from God, this openness to revelation 
is also determined, in its concrete structure, by man's free 
. 53 
attJ.tude. 
50 Ibid., P• 78. 
Sllbid., P• 79. 
52 Ibid., P• 10. 
53 Ibid., p. 94. 
19 
Man is the being who stands in free love before the God 
of a possible revelation. Man listens to God's word or 
God's silence to the extent that he opens up in free 
love for this message of the word or of the silence of 
God. He hears this possible message of the free God 
when he has not, on account of a wrongly directed love, 
narrowed the absolute horizon of his openness for being 
as such, when he has not, in this way, made it impossi-
ble for the word of God to say what it might please him 
to say, to tell us under what guise he wishes to encoun-
ter us. 54 · · 
This statement is in accord with Rahner's theories 
of man becoming what he chooses. Man's choices, or in this 
respect, his "love", have concrete consequences for man as 
he stands before the God of revelation • 
• the openness of man as a finite spirit for the 
free God of a possible revelation is not as such a pure-
ly theoretical concern of a neutral spirituality, but 
that it is, as such, as free decision, religio. In it-
self it is already the free yielding of man to this God 
of a possible revelation. 55 
Man in his transcendent aspect is, 
• the free one who decides about himself and thus 
makes up his mind whether and to what extent he wishes 
to hear the truth and to let God's light shine in his 
spirit. 56 
We have now examined man as a transcendent being 
with an orientation toward being as such. This transcendent 
spirituality opens man to a possible revelation from God. 
There is, however, another aspect to man. Man is a material 
54 rb1·d., 94 5 PP • - • 
55 Ibid., p. 147. 
56 Ibid., p. 95. 
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being. He is a spirit in matter. 
Because man exists within matter the limitations 
which matter imposes upon his existence and upon his know-
ledge of himself and other objects will affect his mode of 
receiving divine revelation, if and when such a revelation 
should occur. Therefore we will examine matter in itself, 
its concommitant aspect as the ground of spatiality and tern-
porality, and its effect on man's way of knowing. We will 
see that materiality combined with freedom are the constitu-
tents of history and that man is basically a historical being. 
These considerations will cause us to realize that man's his-
toricity provides the structures in which he lives and in 
which any revelation will occur. And finally we will see 
man as having to continually look to this history of his 
for a possible revelation. 
Man as spirit cannot succeed in escaping from matter. 
This turning toward the material constitutes an inner moment 
in his spiritual existence. 57 The reason for this is that 
man is continually being called outward by his receptive way 
of knowing the world • 
• man knows as receptive, and insofar as his know-
ledge is the reception of an object, not the apriori 
possession of some knowledge of himself, man is the act 
of being in matter. 58 
57 Ibid., p. 100. 
58 Ibid., p. 109. 
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Man does not start out with any innate knowledge pro-
ceeding from his essence. As a material being it is only by 
stepping out into the world that man can come to himself in 
the return to self which is abstraction. 59 This receptivity 
provides th~ structure for all possible human knowledge. 60 
Now a knowledge which, as such, in its being, is the act 
of a possibility of being, that is distinct from it, real 
and wholely undetermined in itself, a knowledge that is 
the act of being in matter, the knowledge of a material 
being, is known as sense knowledge. 61 
A~ a spirit who must know through sense knowledge 
the spirit requires a sense power through which it may strive 
62 toward its proper goal of grasping being as such. Man's 
sensibility does not exist mainly for itself, but exists as 
a power which emanates from the spirit and for the purposes 
63 
of the spirit. The power of the spirit is the Vorgriff, 
mentioned above in our discussion of transcendence, but 
which here is seen in its connection with sensibility itself. 
It is to be remembered that the Vorgriff is not a 
grasp of being itself but is only an anticipatory grasp of 
being which takes place and becomes po~sible only in the 
64 grasp of the appearance. Man also is grasped within the 
59 Ibid., pp. 102-3. 
60 Ibid., P• 103. 
6lrbid., p. 109. 
62rbid., P• 113. 
63 Ibid., p. 125. 
64Ibid., p. 127. 
realm of appearance, for appearance includes man as he be-
65 
comes aware of himself in his dealings with the world. 
Man discovers that he himself, along with his fellow men, 
is the most fascinating object of his knowledge. 
22 
If a man has to be spirit and can be such only by turn-
ing towards the appearance, he cannot not be interested 
in the greatest and fullest possible appearance, in the 
eventual totality of appearances. For as the appearances 
increase in variety and number, that which is the spirit's 
end appears more clearly in them: being as such, that ex-
tends also beyond the world. Now the appearance which is 
in itself the most spiritual is man himself. Hence he is 
the appearance which, by itself, can be the fullest appear 
ance for being as such. But that which man is appears on-
ly in the unfolding reality of possible humanity, in the 
history of man as such. That is why, on account of his 
spiritual nature, man, in ord~r to be spirit, is essen-
tially referred to history. 6o 
Rahner, following Thomistic thought, does not define 
matter as a thing. It is a metaphysical component of a 
67 
thing, but can never be considered as a thing in itself. 
In itself it is wholly undetermined and can be called a to-
68 tal potentiality for being. Despite its undifferentia-
tion, or precisely because of it, it is the principle of in-
dividuation of all beings. 
65 Ibid., P• 138. 
66 144. Ibid., p. 
67 Ibid., P• 108. 
68 Ibid., p. 109. 
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Because the whatness is general, matter appears as the 
~round which, on account of its emptiness and its indif-
ference for any determined whatness, makes it possible 
for this multipliable 6Whatness to be this or that well determined whatness. 
As a result the empty potentiality of matter is the 
principle behind number or quantity. And number and progres-
sion, which matter make possible, are the bases of spatiality 
and temporality. 70 
The quiddity, the object of our knowledge, appears to us 
as by itself universal, indifferent to be a particular 
this or that, hence as a determination which can come to 
stand as often as one pleases in the wherein of the mat-
ter that bears it. When such a form~ such a quiddity, 
does in fact repeatedly subsist in matter, so that the 
same reality is several times repeated, it becomes pos-
sible to add up these several reproductions. Counting 
is possible only where that which is to be counted ap-
pears previous to the counting, as the repetition of the 
same. And since matter is the principle of the possible 
repetition of the same, we must necessarily consider it 
the principle of number. But number implies quantity. 
Matter is the principle of quantity, since the latter is 
but the multiple repetition of the same. 71 
As the principle of quantity, matter also becomes 
the principle behind spatiality, which is based on the pos-
sibility of repetition and number. 
Now matter is such a principle not only with respect to 
several things that are really distinct from each other; 
it must necessarily also carry out this, its essential 
principle. Hence it makes of the single thing something 
quantitative in itself. Now the repetition of the same 
69 Ibid., p. 112. 
70 Ibid., P• 114. 
71 Ibid. 
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within one and the same thing is nothing but its spatial-
ity, its being innerly affected by ouantity, the real di-
versity of the same thing within its unity. Thus we may 
say: a being whose innermost make-up contains matter as 
an essential inner principle is spatial. 72 
In addition, matter in its undetermined possibili-
ties, becomes the basis of time • 
• the material being is one which always points to-
wards the totality of the realization of its possibili-
ties as the future of its inner movement and keeps striv-
ing towards it. Since these possible determinations, 
whose simultaneous realizations would constitute the re-
alization of matter's illimited potentialities, exclude 
each other at least partially as simultaneous determina-
tions of the underlying matter, the totality of the pos-
sible realizations of the potentiality of matter is al-
ways delayed and is never given all at once. The total 
realization of the possibilities of a material being is 
possible only in the succession of the latter's inner 
movement. In other words: the being is temporal. 73 
Time is therefore not an external standard imposed 
on beings but is an "inner protracting of the thing itself;" 
of being as it strives to attain the totality of its possi-
bilities, each moment perishing in its turn as the movement 
74 Time and soace are not something which man is goes on. 
thrust into, but are within him as elements of his very be-
ing. 75 These elements thrust him into the history of hu-
manity. 
72 Ibid., 114 15 pp. - • 
73Ibid., p. 115. 
74 Ibid. 
75 
Ibid., p. 117. 
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It follows that a sin~le man can never exhaustively and 
at one time actualize that which belongs to him by way 
of possibilities as a material being. That is why refer-
ring to other beings of his kind, which every man does 
as this particular individual, is not something unimpor-
tant; it is a referring to a multitude of men, to a hu-
manity which only as a whole, can really make manifest 
that which is essentially given to each single man deep 
down in -his possibilities, but only as possibilities. 
Man is real only in a humanity. 76 
It must be added that history for Rahner is something 
more than mere progression. It includes the essential ele-
77 
ment of freedom and originality. And there is human his-
tory only when this freedom can be combined with the elements 
of space and time which result from material existence • 
• • there is history in the human sense only where, in 
a togetherness of free persons in their multiplicity, the 
activity of freedom expands in a world, i.e. in space and 
time, where the intelligible acts of freedom must, in or-
der to become manifest, extend in space and time, where 
they need space-time in order to be themselves. And pre-
cisely such a historicity is found in man because he is 
essentially a free, self-subsistent personality, which 
must freely realize itself, through a multiplicity of 
such personalities as the total realization of the very 
essence of such a personality in space and time. 7B 
At this point man has been shown to be firmly situa-
ted as a transcendent being who lives out and strives with 
his transcendence within the boundaries of matter and his-
toricity. How would it be possible for God to communicate 
with such a being if he chose to do so? There seems to be 
76 Ibid., p. 116. 
77 Ibid., p. 117. 
78 Ibid. 
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an immense gap between the supramundane, immaterial God and 
the human who can only grasp what is sensible as a proper ob-
ject of his knowledge. Even immaterial concepts are grasped 
79 
by man as things, as objects which possess being. This 
gap must be bridged so that revelation does not become theo-
retically impossible within Rahner's system of thought. 
Rahner bridges this gap by means of the concept of word. 
In principle every being may be determined in function 
of that which appears. This determination can take 
place only through a negation. 80 
This negation through the human word is the way in 
which man can look for the existence of extramundane reality 9 
represented to him in a human way. 
Every transcendent reality may in principle be represen-
ted to man not only in its most general determinations, 
but also according to its specific properties. It may 
be represented negatively through this historical app~ar­
ance that we call word. The word itself is in its turn 
the synthesis of an innerworldly, historical reality and 
of a negation. 81 
The word will allow hlan to stand before being-as-such 
and know of its existence. The word brings man before the 
God of revelation. 
79 Ibid., P• 130. 
80 Ibid., p. 136. 
81 Ibid., 138 9 pp. - • 
27 
insofar as it always refers to an appearance, the 
human word can be the way in which every being may be 
revealed. Insofar as the human word refers to a concept 
which, through negation, represents an extramundane be-
ing, it may, when spoken by the extramundane God, reveal 
to man the existence and the inner possibility of such a 
being. 82 
It must be remembered, however, that man is not ex-
actly standing directly before the extramundane God. He is 
standing before God as God is revealed in appearances. This 
causes man to turn to his own history, in search of just such 
an appearance, as the arena in which God might reveal himself 
to man. 
In order to stand before being as such, man must turn to-
wards the appearance. the appearance means not only 
the single sense object of external experience, but the 
whole of innerworldly being, which comprises also the 
history of man, and, insofar as man 8 ~s always man in man-kind, also the history of mankind. 
And such a revelation would not only take place in the human 
word but is free and historical in its very nature. 
Such a free action of God, which takes place within the 
empty, but already real space of a human being, is al-
ready historical by itself. It is not pre-historical, 
like the creation of the human being, which although 
free, had no partner, so that in it God acted only with 
himself. Moreover it is not universal and necessary. 
It is free, hence imprevisible. We can grasp and under-
stand it only in itself. There is no point, no presuppo-
sition in the world, from which its actuality and its 
proper nature might be determined. 84 
82Ibid., p. 137. 
83rbid., p. 143. 
84
rbid., pp. 139-40. 
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By saying this Rahner situates revelation firmly 
within human history, but such revelation need not be occur-
ring constantly within a human history. Certain historical 
85 
moments may be more crucial in the process of revelation. 
A man may even find the most significant events of revela-
tion by looking at the life of another human being. 
For the whole life of the single person, who can perma-
nently possess a revelation only by turning back to a 
certain point of history that can never be repeated, 
who can possess it only in the words in which it has 
been expressed, it makes no essential difference whe-
ther he has to turn to one point of his own history or 
to one in the history of another person, so long as he 
can come to know that at this point of a human history 
a revelation has really taken place. There would exist 
an essential difference only if man were always able, 
in his own life, to repeat this revelation at will in 
its original form. 86 
Rahner uses his discussion of revelation in its his-
torical and transcendent aspects to make a summation of the 
whole of his anthropology. Man is the listener for a pos-
sible revelation of God • 
• man is essentially the being who, in his inner-
most nature, listens to a possible verbal revelation 
of God in human history. Only he who listens in this 
way and only to the extent that he listens in this way, 
is that what he has properly to be: a human being. 87 
Rahner feels that he has now reached the end of his 
metaphysical inquiry into the nature of man. The product 
of his inquiry has been to make man the being who exists in 
essential readiness for the word of God. 
85rbid., p. 141. 
8 6rbid. 
87rbid., p. 144. 
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When the potentiality of man and the luminosity of 
God come together in the actual event of revelation they do 
so in the free activity of both the speaker and hearer of 
88 
the 't.:rord. Since a free activity is "always unpredictable, 
hence final and unique" revelation cannot simply be an exten-
sion of man's natural knowledge of God which he receives 
through creation. 89 
Because of this freedom God can manifest his personal 
countenance and reveal his nature in a way which cannot 
be discovered apriori in some other manner. 90 
Rahner is careful to safeguard the gratuity of reve-
lation, but he also emphasizes that there is nothing to im-
pede a revelation coming to man if God should will to reveal 
himself. 
The first statement of our general ontology said that to 
the extent that being is being, it is presence to itself, 
luminosity. It followed that pure Being could not con-
tain anything that, because of its absolute 'irration-
ality' was unable to be expressed in the word of a reve-
lation. 91 
Rahner, speaking from the concrete experiences of 
Christianity and not from any a priori rintological presuppo-
sitions, points toward the actual historical incidence of 
revelation. 
88Ibid., p. 148. 
89 Ibid., p. 77. 
90 Ibid., p. 81. 
91 Ibid., p. 80. 
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Pure being is always already known not only as the final 
whereunto of man's absolute transcendence, but also as 
the supremely free will that carries the finite beings. 
It manifests itself freely and personally by freely act-
ing upon its creature. This free and personal manifes-
tation has not come to an end with the creation of the 
finite spirit. 92 
We have seen that while there is nothing in God's 
nature which precludes the giving of a revelation; God can 
act as a free person and either manifest or not manifest him-
self to man as he wills. In revelation a relationship be-
tween man and God is established in which God has actual pas-
sibilities with regards to activity directed toward man. and 
93 
man has the power of knowing this activity if it does occur. 
Man's transcendence towards the being that is absolutely 
luminous and totally intelligible is at the same time at 
least the openness for a God who can act freely with re-
gard to man in a way which man cannot discover by him-
self. Hence the transcendence towards pure being is a 
standing before the inscrutable mystery whose way can-
not be investigated and whose decisions cannot be probed • 
• the knowledge of God as the absolute being implies 
that we must consider the possibility of a divine activ-
ity which goes beyond the free creation of the finite 
spirit. 9 4 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 77. 
94 Ibid., p. 78. 
CHAPTER III 
REVELATION, DOCTRINE AND DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the previous chapter we discussed Rahner's ontol-
ogy and anthropology and saw how these lines of thought led 
to man's ability to hear a divine revelation. Our purpose 
now is to discuss revelation in its dynamic implications for 
doctrinal development. Then we will more specifically con-
sider the various mechanisms which Rahner establishes for 
such development. 
Human history is the ground in which God works among 
men and is not opposed to God; as if God can only be seen to 
work in the miraculous event which lifts man out of normal 
historical reality. God moves in history and does so by be-
ing its goal; thus granting history its dynamism. Therefore 
man can look to his own historical reality for signs of trans-
95 
cendence. By justifying the legitimacy of historical ac-
tivity in this way Rahner establishes an evolutionary view 
of the world and of revelation, which he feels is in line 
with Christian thinking at its most basic level. 
95Karl Rahner, Revelation and Tradition, p. 12. 
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• what is needed is not so much a transposition of 
the Christian understanding of the world and man into a 
evolutionary view of the worldt but rather the bold and 
radical carrying through to its logical conclusion of 
that view of the world which essentially and in princi-
ple has been present all along in Christianity, and still 
is prese~t in it, as opposed to those portrayals of the 
world which have been superimposed upon it and are alien 
to it, and .to which Christianity itself has formerly been 
exposed as a result of the influence of a Hellenistic 
view of the world. 96 
Man's perception of the word of God is always posited 
within a historical standpoint, for man is a historical being. 
In addition to this, the concepts through which God's revela-
tion is mediated to man, and this is besides the mediation of 
linguistic forms themselves, are part of man's experience of 
divine communication. 
For revelation is not revelation of concepts, not the 
creation of new fundamental axioms, introduced in a 
final and fixed form into man's consciousness 'from out-
side' by some supra-historical transcendent cause. It 
is revelation by means of concepts taken from the history 
of human civilization (although, of course, the latter 
stands continuously in the light of the grace of the 
self-revealing God). Thus these concepts always have a 
pre-history, they are connected by thousands of root-
fibers with the whole of man's historically developed 
understanding of himself. 97 
Examples of such concepts are: the ideas of flesh, 
the significance of blood, and the meaning of the redeemer. 
96 I ' Karl Rahner, 'Christology in the Setting of Modern 
Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World," Theologi-
cal Investigations vol. 11, trans. David Bourke (New York: 
The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 222. 
97 Karl Rahner, "The Historicity of Theology," p. 68. 
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Throughout history these concepts have changed and gradually 
become more or less significant as history has altered man 
and civilizations. 
Rahner does not imply that revelation is completely 
subservient to the historical mediations of concepts and 
language. Revelation maintains its value as God's eternal 
truth even while it is couched in the terms and understand-
ings of the historical era in which it is received • 
• the divine sovereignty of revelation consists not 
in the fact that it presupposes no conditions already 
existing in history, that it has no perspectives of un-
derstanding such that they are historically conditioned 
and subject to variation and change, but rather in the 
fact that it is not, ultimately speaking, subject to 
these historical conditions even though it is posited 
in them. 98 
Besides the history of man, revelation has its own 
history, beginning with its reception by man. Otherwise it 
might be thought that revelation is received by man fully 
formed. 
If transcendence always has its very being in history, 
is always mediated historically, and if man has a trans-
cendent condition which is constituted as a permanent 
feature of his life as a person precisely by what we 
call divinizing grace by God's self-communication (not 
by some other causal operation), then precisely that ab-
solute transcendence directed towards the absolute in-
timate presence of the ineffable mystery giving himself 
to man has a history and this is what we call the history 
of revelation. 99 
98Karl Rahner, "Christology in the Setting of Modern 
Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World," p. 215. 
99 Karl Rahner, Revelation and Tradition, p. 13. 
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100 Revelation is the core of human history and as 
such it directs history to a transcendent goal. It unfolds 
continually, as it strives to reach its final goal in the 
direct vision of God. Until this final vision is achieved 
even God's enduring truth is only partially understood and 
101 
changes through the unpredictable twists of human history. 
Rahner finds the prototype of an original statement 
of revelation in Scripture. However, even in the Scriptures 
there can be found a difference between the original event 
102 
of revelation and human reflection upon that event. 
This reflection on the event is necessary because revelation 
must be heard if it is to become actual and historical. 
• there is no proclaimed revelation except in the 
form of a believed revelation. A believed, i.e. heard, 
revelation, always already includes also - in so far as 
it is a revelation understood, accepted and assimilated 
- a synthesis of the Word of God and the word of a par-
ticular man which he in particular can and indeed must 
speak in his historical situation and from his particu-
lar standpoint •••• 103 
Rahner emphasizes the importance of scripture to 
dogma by saying that a definition of dogma is "the develop-
104 
ment of the correctly understood contents of Scripture." 
100Ibid., p. 11. 
101 Karl Rahner, The Christian of the Future, p. 25. 
102 Ibid. 
103rbid., p. 61. 
104Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 67. 
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Yet there have historically been two well-springs of Catholic 
faith: the second being tradition. This has prevented Catho-
lies from formulating a sola-scriptura principle such as op-
erates theoretically in some Protestant theologies. Rahner 
confronts the problem of how to evaluate the importance of 
Scripture within Catholic doctrine by formulating a sola-
~~riptura principle within a specific framework of Catholic 
understanding • 
• • it is entirely possible to formulate a Catholic 
sola-scriptura principle with regard to the Church's 
deposit of faith, £!Ovided that we understand this in 
a Catholic sense and therefore understand it to involve 
also an authoritative attestation and interpretation of 
holy scripture by the living word of the Church and her 
magisterium, and an attestation of scripture itself and 
its authoritative interpretation which cannot be re-
placed by scripture itself. 105 
The truths of the Catholic faith can be found in the 
scriptures but this can be interpreted in different ways. 
Does Rahner mean this in a very literal way so that the ex-
act words of scriptural passages can be applied to situa-
tions occurring many hundreds of years after the canon of 
scripture was established, or does he mean that there is 
something in scripture which is always reaching beyond it-
self and so becomes applicable to all times and places? 
Rahner views scripture in the sense that scripture holds 
the dynamism for its own interpretation and that as a dy-
namic entity it demands a dynamic response to its word. 
105Karl Rahner, "Scripture and Tradition," p. 107. 
This dynamic human response to the word of God began even 
while the kerygma was being proclaimed • 
• theological interpretation of apostolic times is 
already at work in the handing down of the words of 
Jesus, giving them its own precision and adapting them 
to the special circumstances of the assembly. 106 
This adaptation and response to the preaching of 
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Jesus is evident in the written words of scripture. Scrip-
ture includes human reflection about faith and the possibil-
107 ity of further drawing out of Christian truths. This 
historical process of dynamic response to scripture contin-
ued throughout the history of the Church. 
Many assertions, guaranteed as inerrant at once by the 
Church of apostolic times and by the inspiration of 
Scripture, are theologically derived from the original 
revelation. Since this is so, and since this deriva-
tive theology within the Scriptures still makes the 
just claim on us to be accepted as obligatory doctrine 
of faith, while it is itself a stage of development 
with regard to its own origin, there is therefore in 
Scripture itself a real development of dog~a, and not 
merely of theology. Thus the development of dogma 
within Scripture is the authenticated exemplary in-
stance for the development of dogma in general, an ex-
ample which is in itself obligatory for all who accept 
Scripture as a whole as authentic testimony of faith.l08 
The reason that Scripture holds the possibility of 
development is that scripture, as God's word, is inexhaus-
tible. 109 Scripture is an "original word" which is spoken 
106Karl Rahner, "Exegesis and Dogmatic Theology," 
Theological Investigations vol. 5, trans. Karl-H. Kruger 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 75. 
107Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 69. 
108Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p.7. 
109 Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology,"p.l55 
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in a concrete situation and yet carries within itself mean-
110 
ing and significance for every situation. 
If, therefore, every word suggests also what it contains 
that is unsaid, then it carries a superfluity of meaning 
which is not actually knowable at every moment, a mean-
ing which ~s revealed only in a history of hermeneutic 
experience a~d emerges more openly in language in the 
course of the dialogue that is history. 111 
The problem of modern man is to come to understand 
the meaning of scripture for him and try to make it truly 
112 his own in his historical situation. 
The answer would have to be that, in the light of con-
temporary 'faith consciousness' and preaching of the 
Church, the need for a translation of the Christian 
message into 'modern terms' (which is already shown as 
necessary by the New Testament itself) shows that by 
pointing out the dangers of such an undertaking (adapt-
ing and falsifying what has been revealed), we might 
gain the proper criteria for judging such attempts, 
which can proceed only out of the harmony of contem-
porary religious consciousness with the faith and doc-
trine of all ages and all generations of the Church 
and its experiences in interpreting the 'gospel'. 113 
We will now examine Rahner 1 s thoughts on tradition 
and its significance for doctrine and for doctrinal develop-
ment. The truths of the Church are not handed down by scrip-
ture alone. Tradition plays a part in the Church's memories 
llOKarl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 71. 
111 Ibid., p. 70. 
112Karl Rahner, "Theology in the New Testament," p. 37. 
113Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 53. 
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of her past and even in the authenticating of scripture it-
self; for scripture can only be understood by the Church in 
114 
which it originated. Tradition is the guidepost for de-
cisions concerning the nature of the Church and is a way of 
preserving the apostolic experience for succeeding genera-
tions of Christians. 
Their own experience is preserved and present together 
with their Word. Spirit and Word together form the per-
manent active potentiality of an experience which is in 
prineiple the same as that of the Apostles even if, be-
cause it is supported on the Apostles' Word handed down 
in Tradition, it is an experience, resting on that of 
the Apostles and prolonging theirs, which has historical 
roots and can never continue to live if it is cut off 
from connection with the Apostles through Word, Sacra-
ment and the handing down of authority. 115 
In the above consideration of scripture it was noted 
that scripture, iu its dynamic relation to the hearer of the 
Word, contains a dynamism that forces interpretation and the 
ever-new appropriation of that Word by the listener as he is 
confronted by it. Rahner finds the same mechanism operating 
in the handing down of apostolic experience through tradition. 
Tradition contains an inner dynamism which provides the impe-
tus for its own development. 
This element of being handed on, constitutive in the tra-
ditio, which is the handing on to truth and reality to-
gether, brings with it basically at once the development 
114Karl Rahner, "I Believe in the Church," Theologi-
cal Investigations vol. 7, trans. David Bourke (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1971), p. 108. 
115 Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 68. 
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of dogma. For such a traditio takes place at a given mo-
ment of space and timP., is necessarily historical, and 
absorbs the recipient and his historical uniqueness, 
which is also a property of his knowledge, into the pro-
cess of traditio itself. 116 
As tradition has developed it has been the role of 
the Church's magisterium, in its office as definitive teacher 
of the faith, w~ich has been emphasized. To some it seems 
that it is solely the maRisterium which has input into devel-
opment of tradition. Rahner would disagree with this view. 
Tradition develops and moves within history through and in 
connection with the collective life of the Church as a whole. 
The de facto bearers of the teaching office are, at least 
in respect of the content of their teaching, dependent 
upon a Church who is not constituted simply by the one-
sided functions of the official authorities in the Church. 
This faith, this history of faith, this development of 
dogma on which the teaching office depends in the con-
crete, are factors to which all members of the Church 
contribute, each in his own way, by their lives, the con-
fession of their faith, their prayers, their concrete de-
cisions, the theology which they work out for themselves, 
and their activities in all this are far from being con-
fined merely to putting into practice truths and norms 
deriving from the teaching office itself. 117 
Understanding the dynamism which is present within 
tradition is important in coming to understand doctrine. 
By studying the long, and sometimes convoluted, history of 
some of the Church's teaching we can gain a greater appre-
116Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 24. 
117Karl Rahner, "The Teaching Office in the Present 
Day Crisis of Authority," p. 8. 
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ciation of the meaning of a particular truth and its signifi-
cance to the faith as the Church's consciousness of itself 
has grown to maturity through history. 118 
Up to this point we have been discussing the dynamic 
characteristics of revelation which allow for and even re-
quire~ its development. This dynamism has continued as reve-
lation has been handed down through history by way of scrip-
ture and tradition. At this point it is necessary to estab-
lish what distinguishes a statement of revelation from a 
statement of dogma and what connection there may be between 
these two types of statements. 
Rahner states that "A dogmatic statement is not iden-
tical with the original Word of revelation and the original 
119 
statement of faith. He finds the unique quality of state-
ments of revelation in their function as unique historical 
salvation events • 
• there are certain events and statements • • which 
form the enduring and unsurpassable norma normans~ ~ 
normata for all later dogmatic statements •••• Even if 
and when these statements have also all those elements 
which we have elsewhere attributed to dogmatic statements, 
they nevertheless have one thing no other statement has 
- they belong to that unique historical event of salva-
tion itself to which all later proclamation and theology 
are referred. They are in this very definite sense more 
118 
Karl Rahner,"The Immaculate Conception~" Theolo-
gical Investigations vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Balti-
more: Helicon Press, 1961), p. 201. 
119 Kar 1 Rahner, 11 \-lha t is a Dogmatic S ta temen t?," 
T~eological Investigations vol. 5, trans. Karl-H. Kruger 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966)~ p. 60. 
than theology, and even more than absolutely binding 
theology. They are not merely any statement of faith 
but here that statement which remains the permanent 
ground of all other, future statements - they are what 
is handed down and not the unfolding tradition of what 
has been handed down. 120 
41 
The characteristics of dogmatic statements are found 
to be somewhat separate from, but in connection with, revela-
tion. Rahner defines a dogmatic statement as a developing 
or unfolding of the "basic subjective reflection which al-
ready takes place in the mere obedient listening to the Word 
of God, i.e. in faith as 121 such." In this unfolding the 
dogmatic statement is inextricably bound to the existence 
of the Church. It can only exist because there is and must 
122 
be a Church, and because in this Church there must be a 
commonality of belief and of profession of belief. 123 Be-
cause of the ecclesiastical character of dogma, the magis-
terium functions as mediator of revelation in a special way. 
The magisterium is the link between original statements of 
revelation and statements of dogma • 
• the Church and its magisterium recognize that they 
are not the mediators of a revelation which is now being 
granted for the first time. They do not look on their 
office as prophetic, but as one that has only to guard, 
120 Ibid., P· 62. 
121 Ibid., p. 48. 
122 Ibid., P• 52. 
123 Ibid., p. 53. 
transmit and explain the divine revelation which came in 
Jesus Christ at a given point of past history. Thus the 
function of the Church and the magisterium differs in 
quality from the process of the original revelation, 
though the task of the Church is not to be conceived as 
merely that of repeating the original revelation, and 
presenting it as something uttered ~ long ago. The 
Church presents revelation as something that takes place 
'now' as it is uttered by the living voice and offers it-
self to be appropriated this day in the hearing of be-
lievers. Thus the Church and the magisterium distinguish 
their function - by differentiation, not separation - from 
the process of revelation itself, and see their function 
as that of teaching men authoritatively in each age. It 
is true that the very fact of the Church and the magis-
terium, once it has been recognized by faith, is the im-
mediate guarantee of a legitimate connection between the 
original revelation and the pronouncement of the magis-
terium. 124 
Because Rahner strongly emphasizes the magisterium's 
role with regard to dogma we will, in the next few pages, 
more closely examine his ideas about the magisterium, the 
pope, and their respective functions as doctrinal regulators. 
Rahner views the rnagisterium as that place within the 
Church where, through the magisterium's "authoritative pro-
nouncernents,'' the Church comes to its most definitive aware-
125 
ness of itself. The magisterium has authoritative pri-
126 
ority over the faith of individual believers, and also 
over the beliefs and convictions of individual theologians 
124Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," Theological Investigations vol. 4, trans. Kevin 
Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 3-4. 
125Karl Rahner, On Heresy, (New York: Herder & 
Herder, 1964), p. 19. 
126Karl Rahner, "I Believe in the Church," Theolo-
gical Investigations vol. 6, trans. David Bourke (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1971), p. 109. 
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wi~hin the Church. 
sure unity of Creed in 
This authority is necessary to in-
12 a 
the Church. 
The function of the magisterium is two-fold. 
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First it can in certain circumstances guarantee the cor-
rectness ~f this theological activity even where (in 
principle or up to now de facto) the activity, just as 
such, has led to no strict consequence but only to a 
conventientia. (We have at least left this possibility 
open). Moreover it guarantees not only that the conse- 129 quence is correct, but also that it is still God's Word. 
The magisterium has the final authority regarding 
assertions or articles of belief; whether it is in putting 
forth a definition or in ruling that some assertions are not 
130 
compatible with Christian teaching. And not only can it 
do this on the substance or content of doctrinal assertions 
but it also can definitively rule on the validity of the 
language in which the doctrine is expressed. 
God's truth is ever one and the same, definitive. It is 
proclaimed by the Church's magisterium. When and where 
that magisterium has expressed the truth entrusted to her 
by Christ in a form that binds the conscience of the faith-
ful, that truth in that form is true and valid for all 
time •••• And this despite the fact that no formulation 
of the truths of faith in human words is ever adequate to 
127Karl Rahner, "Theology and the Church's Teaching 
Authority After the Council," TI!eological Investigations 
vol. 9, trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder & Herder, 
1972), p. 95. 
128 Ibid., p. 87. 
129Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," Theolo-
gical Investigations, vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Balti-
more: Helicon Press, 1961), p. 75. 
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°Karl Rahner, "Theology and the Church's Teaching 
Authority After the Council," p. 89. 
the object referred to by them, and that at least in 
principle, any of them could be retlaced by an even 
better, more comprehensive one. 13 
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Although the magisterium has absolute authority over 
the content and form of doctrinal statements~ Rahner notes 
that many times this authority is exercised in a way which 
is less than an absolute manifestation of the magisterium's 
po"torer • 
• • in very many cases in which the authoritative mag-
isterium is exercised it is not brought to bear with this 
absolute force, and the obligation which it lays upon the 
faithful, is not the assent of their faith properly so-
called, but merely a qualified assent for in such exer-
cises of the official teaching authority of the Church 
the doctrine that is stated though authentic, is not in 
itself irreformable. Rather it is a doctrine that is 
formulated as conscientiously as possible by the teaching 
authority to protect the essential and proper substance 
of the faith. 13 2 
Perhaps part of the reason for the magisterium's re-
luctance to impose its full authority upon doctrinal thought 
is that today there are so many diverse theological langua-
ges and schools of thought. 
• today the Church and her teaching authority are 
forced, to a notably larger extent than formerly, to 
leave to the individual theologies the responsibility 
for seeing that they genuinely do maintain themselves 
in agreement with the Church's creed; that their inter-
pretation of this creed is not such as to interpret 
away the creed itself while paying it mere lip-service, 
131Karl Rahner, On Heresy, p. 60. 
132Karl Rahner, "The Teaching Office of the Church 
in the Present Day Crisis of Authority," Theological Inves-
tigations vol. 12, trans. David Bourke (New York: The Sea-
bury Press, 1974), p. 4. 
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not such as to empty it of its content, but such as re-
ally to maintain its truth. 133 
However, Rahner is firm in emphasizing that this theo-
logical pluralism does not preclude the possibility that the 
Church's magisterium, to protect unity of creed, may in fact 
pronounce anathemas against teachings which it determines to 
be incompatible with orthodox Catholic doctrine. 134 Again, 
while the reality of the pronouncement of anathemas remains, 
theological pluralism may affect the form in which this type 
135 
of official judgment is exercised. 
Having considered the magisterium and its function 
with regard to doctrinal statements we will now turn our at-
tention to the function of the pope as a focus of the magis-
terium's power, and to his role in defining doctrine. 
Like the magisterium, the pope in Rahner's thought 
is a point at which ''the collective consciousness of the 
whole Church attains effective self-awareness" and does so 
in a way which exerts authority over individual members of 
the Church. 136 The papal function, is to clarify this 
self-awareness. A question might be: if there is a collec-
tive consciousness in the Church, why is it necessary for a 
133Karl Rahner, "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity 
of the Creed in the Church," Theological Investigations vol. 
11, trans. David Bourke (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974, 
pp. 17-18. 
134 Ibid., p. 13. 
135Ibid., p. 1'•· 
136Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 34. 
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body such as the magisterium, or an individual, such as the 
pope to clarify or become a focal point for this self-under-
standing? Rahner answers that, 
• the faith of the whole Church, existing prior to 
the defin~tion, does not by any means imply that every 
individual member already explicitly believes the pro-
position in.question as something revealed by God. It 
only means that this faith exists in the Church as an 
attribute of this moral person which is the Church as a 
whole. The function of the papal decision is precisely 
to ascertain this faith and so to impart this general 
faith of the whole Church to those who do not yet be-
lieve. 137 
Papal definition rests traditionally on the promise 
of Christ to keep his Church from error through the power 
of the Spirit. It is this promise that enables the pope to 
138 
make doctrinal pronouncements. However, there is some 
restriction on the activity of the pope. He must decide a 
doctrinal question using ideas that have not simply occurred 
to him as an individual, but which rest on the tradition ex-
istant within the Church. 
One might say that some other sufficiently certain theo-
logical judgment would be enough, for instance, that on 
various grounds, something was implicitly contained in 
the heritage of faith. But in point of fact it is un-
thinkable that this would be discovered for the first 
time at this precise moment by the Pope. And so the 
theological reason which the Pope has must also be 
known and active elsewhere in the Church. 139 
137 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
138Ibid., p. 32. 
139 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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Up to this point Rahner has dealt with the pope and 
teaching office primarily in the present. He also has some 
thoughts on the function of the magisterium in the future. 
According to Rahner, the continuing situation of theological 
pluralism and diverse theological languages will place the 
future magisterium in a po~ition where any ''fresh positive 
140 expressions of doctrine" will be difficult to present • 
• it is conceivable that genuine 'progress' in dog-
matic development in the future will move, not so much 
in the direction of a wider, more exact unfolding and 
precise definition of traditional dogma, but simply in 
that of a more living, radical grasp and statement of 
the ultimate fundamental dogmas themselves. In 
short, it is conceivable that the 'change' in the Church's 
teaching on dogma and morals may move in the direction 
of quite considerable 'decontrol' and a general tendency 
to leave questions open. 141 
Also, the Church of the future may increasingly find 
that its role in defining is taking on the character of sim-
plification; of emphasizing and clarifying the most central 
points of Catholic doctrine, rather than generating pronounce-
ments on new doctrines. 
The situation of the Church today in terms of theology 
and speculation is such that we may presume that any 
authentic, and still more definitorial decisions on doc-
trine on the part of the Church will in the future con-
sist not so much in fresh explicitations and developments 
of the ancient teaching of the Church as in the special 
emphasis which she gives to particular points of doctrine 
14
°Karl Rahner, "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity 
of the Creed in the Church," p. 19. 
141 
Karl Rahner, The Christian of the Future, trans. 
W.J. O'Hara (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), p. 34. 
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in order to maintain their truth against false interpre-
tations. 142 
When the Church, through its magisterium, expresses 
143 
revelation in definitive propositions it becomes dogma. 
But once dogma is posited does it remain eternally the same 
or can it somehow change? We will now proceed to examine 
how Rahner treats the subject of dogmatic development. We 
will approach this question in two stages. In the first 
stage some general remarks on why Rahner feels that dogma 
can and must develop will be presented and in the second, 
we will examine the mechanisms through which it does develop. 
For Raber, a dogmatic definition does not signal 
the end of thought and reflection upon the content of the 
dogma. 144 Rahner feels that dogmatic formulations are in-
deed universally and continually binding upon the faithful 
but that the fact of being defined does not necessarily make 
145 
everything within the definition perfectly clear. All 
dogmatic formulas are expressed in historical language and 
142 Karl Rahner, "The Teaching Office of the Church 
in the Present Day Crisis of Authority," p. 22. 
143Karl Rahner, "Theology in the New Testament," 
Theological Investigations vol. 5, trans. Karl-H. Kruger 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 133. 
144Karl Rahner and Karl Lehmann, Kerygma and Dogma, 
(New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), p. 72. 
145Karl Rahner, "The Position of Christology in the 
Church Between Exegesis and Dogmatics," Theological Investi-
gations vol. 11, trans. David Bourke (New York: The Seabury 
Press, 1974), p. 204. 
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as such partici~ate in the stream of all historical develop-
ment. 
Anyone who takes ceriously the 'historicity' of human 
truth (in which God's truth too has become incarnate in 
Revelation) must see that neither the abandonment of a 
formula n~r its preservation in a petrified form does 
justice to human understanding. For history is precise-
ly not an atomized beginning-ever-anew; it is rather 
(the-;ore spiritual it is) a becoming-new which preserves 
the old, and preserves it all the more as old, the more 
spiritual this history is. But this pr;9ervation, which 
recognizes the true uniqueness of something which has 
taken place once for all, is only historical preserva-
tion when the history goes on, and the movement of re-
flexion departs from the old formula which has been 
reached in order to discover it (just this old formula 
itself) ap.ain. 146 
The key to Rahner's understanding of language and 
dogma is that dogmatic language or formulations are not iden-
tical with the object of faith itself. Because any formula-
tion is subject to the vagaries of human language, which is 
in itself an interpretation of what is spoken of, it is pos-
sible to come upon new formulations of dogmatic statements 
which do not change the content of any old forms but become 
more in touch with contemporary understandings and more in 
contact with other disciplines. 147 This is not less true 
of dogmas than of other statements, but is more true be-
cause of the need for dogma to make "present and actual the 
146Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," 
p. 150. 
147Karl Rahner, "Heresies in the Church Today?," 
p. 121. 
so 
Christian message" by translating itself into the many dif-
148 
ferent languages which the world speaks at different times. 
Those who feel that doctrinal language has eternal validity 
in itself may be forgetting that the language within which 
the doctrine is expressed is itself a decision. 
Because a dogmatic statement has this Church significance 
it also always involves a terminological ruling on com-
munity language, which may, on the one hand, be binding, 
and on the other must be taken account of in the inter-
pretation of the Church's explanations and must not be 
confused with the object itself, or with a statement 149 
that is only possible because it is based on the object. 
Because dogmatic terminology is human terminology 
and is therefore conditioned by man's language and the human 
150 
understanding of the world which his language reveals, 
the terminology is going to be exposed to historical forces 
which sometimes are beyond the control of the Church's mag-
isterium. The magisterium may in part be able to influence 
the understanding of a terminology but it can never be in 
151 
complete control of it. The Church must be aware of the 
limitations and historical nature of its pronouncements • 
• the word which is inadequate for expressing the 
thing-always, solely, inevitably and most frequently 
indeed, in its communal use-brings out certain charac-
teristics of the matter referred to and equally inevi-
tably leaves other characteristics in the background. 
148Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 67. 
149rbid., p. 92. 
150Ibid. , p. 105. 
151Karl Rahner, "What is a Dogmatic Statement?," Theo 
logical Investigations vol. 5, trans. Karl-H.Kruger (Balti-
more: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 57. 
It creates new relations to certain other matters, and 
equally does not bring out certain existing relations 
with other realities of the faith. The historically 
conditioned, limited terminology lends historical fi-
niteness, concreteness~ and contingence to the state-
ment of faith itself, particulerly in its theological 
form. Added to this there is the fact that it is ba-
sically impossible to furnish every time an absolutely 
unequivocal, reflectively expressed definition of as-
sociated terms, together with the terminology used • 
• This is the reason why ecclesiastical declara-
tions of doctrine, ecclesiastical statements of dogma, 
also contain implicitly a determined terminology. 152 
When we realize the historical nature of doctrinal 
51 
terminology, it is possible to become aware of the complexi-
ties of defining anything with absolute clarity. A defini-
tion of terms does not really solve the problem since those 
words with which we define terms are themselves historically 
conditioned and may also be in need of a definition. One 
can become enmeshed in what Rahner refers to as "the vast, 
labyrinthine history of these terms, which can by no means 
be adequately 'defined.'" 153 
Because of the limitations which history places on 
all use of language, Rahner comes to the conclusion that the 
Church's doctrinal formulations use terminology whose suita-
bility but not truth are open to question. 154 A refusal to 
bow to the historical nature of language and the subsequent 
152 Ibid., p. 55. 
153Karl Rahner, "The Historicity of Theology," p. 68. 
154Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 92. 
52 
need for flexibility in terminology can lead to mistaken be-
lief. 
The particular linguistic formulation which has been han-
ded down cannot be the measure of correct belief. The 
very holding on to traditional modes of expression often 
leads, on the contrary, to heresy (as, for example, mono-
physitism, and monothelitism are, according to the latest 
researches of J. Lebon and others, 'heresy' because they 
refused to undergo a linguistic and conceptual differen-
tiation at a time when the traditional formulas had in 
fact become ambiguous). 155 
To avoid the danger of adhering to terminology too 
zealously and letting the true meaning of the doctrine be-
come twisted it is necessary to revise doctrine in a "for-
ward direction,": a direction toward more adequate expres-
156 
sion for the contemporary historical period. Truth must 
wear the mantle of its age if it is to be a living truth. 
If it does not, or does so insufficiently, it does not 
become more timeless and more universally valid. It 
probably will merely bear the style of the mind of an 
earlier age which has become a habit, and which is 
wrongly regarded as an expression of the eternally iden-
tical validity of the truth of the gospel, because it 
is old and well known. This hardening of the form in 
which the truth of the gospel is expressed is then it-
self nothing but the dangerous symptom of an indiffer-
ence to this truth, from which the age is suffering 
whether consciously or not, and it is a symptom of the 
lack of strength to assimilate and effectively to make 
it their own from which such 'traditionalists' are suf-
fering. 157 
155 Ibid., p. 66. 
156Karl Rahner, "Theology in the New Testament," 
p. 29. 
157Karl Rahner, On Heresy, p. 61. 
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Rahner goes on to point out some examples of terminal-
ogy which might undergo change without sacrificing the under-
lying meanin~ of wtat is defined and is binding for Catholic 
belief. 
Words such as 'person' and 'nature' in Christology, 'or-
iginal sin'·in the theology of sin, 'transsubstantiation' 
in the doctrine of the Eucharist, 'infusion', 'habitus', 
'increase of merit' etc. in the doctrine of justification 
certainly do point to a reality of faith and of binding 
conviction. But they also always imply the influence of 
certain linguistic conventions and language in the form-
ing of definitions within a given confession which are 
not necessary and could in principle be altered without 
any surrender of what is really expressed in such defini-
tions. 158 
Rahner also states that there are examples which show 
that the Church has on occasion not only changed the terminal-
ogy which it has used in its definitions but has actually 
159 
changed the concepts which it used to express its dogmas. 
An example of this is Augustine's formulation of the doctrine 
of justification. 
Augustine was able, and had, to maintain-and the Church 
of his time did so as well in its doctrine-that every 
unjustified sinner sinned in every one of his acts. In 
the lan~uage of the post-Tridentine Church it is impos-
sible to formulate things in this way, although it can 
be shown that the differing formulations do not, with 160 
regard to what they refer to, contradict one another. 
158 Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Ecumenical 
Discussion," Th?ological Investigations vol. 11. trans. David 
Bourke (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 41. 
159 Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 93. 
160 Ibid. 
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The problem of pinning down exactly what the various 
theological terminologies "mean" has implications for ecu-
menical discussion. It is necessary for participants in the 
discussion to enlarge their grasp of different terminologies 
so that their dialogue can advance constructively. 161 It 
is possible for disputants to actually be talking about dif-
ferent things, or to feel that they are in disagreement when 
they are actually agreeing in principle to the most salient 
points of the doctrine in question. Rahner offers as an ex-
ample someone who in a theological dispute denies the exis-
tence of original sin. 
Certainly all that would initially be taking place in 
such a case is that a particular ecclesiastical defini-
tion, in some sense binding for Catholics, would be be-
ing rejected. For the question would in fact still re-
main completely open as to whether the rejection of the 
term 'original sin' really entailed a rejection of the 
reality signified by and under the term original sin in 
a Tridentine formulation of a proposition of faith. 162 
Rahner recommends that we listen with generosity to 
theologians who seem to oppose Catholic truths. When an-
other theologian supports a position which seems to explicit-
ly contradict Catholic dogma we can certainly answer with a 
forceful denial. But even then we must question whether the 
position which we are opposing is truly a rejection of the 
161Karl Rahner, The Christian of the Future, p. 39. 
162Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Ecumenical 
Discussion," p. 41. 
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Catholic dogma or simply a misunderstanding of the dogmatic 
163 
proposition. Bultmann and other modern protestant theo-
logians may be closer to Catholic theological positions than 
Catholics or they themselves suspect. 
Who can say precisely that the basic positions held by 
Rudolph Bul~mann are, in the last analysis, really un-
Catholic, or whether it is merely that the propositions 
themselves have not been understood or developed with 
sufficient precision, and that this is why conclusions 
have been derived from them by Bultmann or his followers 
which seem to run counter to the ultimate basic princi-
ples of Catholicism. • • 164 · 
Misunderstanding of dogmatic formulas are possible 
because history, with its concommitant changes in language, 
is a process within which the Church lives. Dogmatic for-
mulas contain implicit elements of linguistics and have been 
developed in ways dictated not only by the reality of the 
formulas' object; but also according to linguistic rules 
which might have been different. These linguistic rules are 
formed by "sociological and historical factors in the devel-
opment of human thinking." 165 
Since a person cannot hear a truth without bringing 
to the confrontation the historically based concepts which 
163Karl Rahner, "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity 
of the Creed :f.n the Church," p. 9. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid., p. 14. 
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166 
are already present in his mind, it must also be true 
that this same situation was in effect when the various dog-
matic truths were initially formulated in the Church. One 
can conclude from this that dogmatic truths can only be tru-
ly understood if we look at them in the full significance 
167 
and limitations of their historical context. We can then 
attempt to determine how their historical contexts deter-
mined their form and language. This is a basis for present-
ing dogmatic development as both possible and necessary. 
If the 'making the faith one's own' is historical-and 
how could it be otherwise-and is not merely theological 
reflection on a consciousness of faith, then there must 
be a history of dogmas since this is nothing other than 
the history of the particular form of the absolute con-
sent of faith in any particular time, made on the grounds 
of the one permanent divine revelation as it has been 
given once and for all in Jesus Christ and as it must 
remain in every situation of history-an actual event in168 the consent of faith and not merely of simple theology. 
However, Rahner wants it clearly understood that such 
development in dogma does not mean that the Church is in any 
way changing its truths. 
This does not mean that the ancient formulas which an-
swer the question are eliminated or discarded as anti-
quated or even false, God forbid! The Church and its 
faith are always the same throughout their history, 
166 Karl Rahner, "Theology in the New Testament," 
p. 28. 
167Karl Rahner, "Possible Courses for the Theology 
of the Future," Theological Investigations vol. 13, trans. 
David Bourke (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 47-8. 
168 Karl Rahner, "Theology in the New Testament," 
p. 30. 
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otherwise we should have an atomized history of religion 
composed of event 3fter event, but no one history of the 
one Church and the abiding self-same faith. • But 
since this one identical Church had and still has a his-
tory, the ancient formula is not merely the end. It is 
also the starting-point of a spiritual movement of depar-
ture and return which is our only guarantee or better, 
hope-of having understood the ancient formula. For no 
understanding is possible anywhere if what is understood 
remains fix·ed and frozen and is not launched into the 
movement of that nameless mystery which is the vehicle 
of all understanding. 169 
The historically conditioned understanding of dogma 
is the ferment within dogma, allowing for its possible de-
170 
velopment. Yet the development of dogma has its own 
logical energy and its own logical structure which unfolds 
in actual historical development of dogmas. 171 Because of 
this, dogma is not entirely at the mercy of historical forces. 
It maintains its integrity throughout the various phases of 
its development as it unfolds according to a structure which 
is inherent within the revelation itself. 
The decisive feature of such a change is not 'progress' 
in the sense of acquiring a sort of plus-quantity of 
knowledge (as though the Church had somehow to become 
'cleverer'), but (in principle, at least) the change, 
the new look, of the same reality and truth, appropriate 
to just this age of the Church: it is change in, not of 
identity. 172 
169Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," 
Theological Investigations vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (Balti-
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Rahner feels that acknowledging the development of 
dogma in history is a challenge to the Church. It is a chal-
lenge which, if not accepted, could bring grave difficulties 
to the understanding of doctrine. 
We possess this eternal quality of truth in history, and 
hence we ~an only appropriate it by entrusting ourselves 
to its further course. If we refuse to take this risk, 
the formulations of dogma wrongly claimed to be 'peren-
nial' will become unintelligible, like opaque glass which 
God's light can no longer penetrate. 173 
But what is the nature of such development? The 
Catholic Church considers revelation closed with the death 
of the last apostle. Because of this, dogmatic development 
cannot consist of episodes of "new" revelation which are 
then incorporated into Church teaching. Dogmatic develop-
ment within history must take a different form if it is to 
be both necessary and allowable. The enduring truths must 
be understood in a new way. 174 
The thought of earlier generations, even if it has had 
results in the form of conciliar definitions, is not a 
sort of couch for the thought of later generations. 
Definitions are much less an end than a beginning. A 
Hie Rhodus, An opening. No real achievement is ever 
lost to the Church. But theologians are never spared 
the task of prompt renewal. Anything which is merely 
conserved, or which is merely handed down without a 
fresh, personal exertion beginning at the very sources 
of Revelation, rots as the manna did. 175 
173Karl Rahner, "The Historicity of Theology," p. 71. 
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The very nature of conciliar statements demonstrates 
the necessity of dogmatic development. If it were not neces-
sary to clarify certain points of doctrine throughout his-
tory, there would have been no Church councils. Rahner points 
out that the necessity to clarify doctrine did not only come 
from the outside threat of heresy, but also from the very na-
ture of dogmatic truth itself. 
The degree of theoretical precision and existential vi-
tality with which man understands what he hears depends 
on the degree to which he comprehends it within the to-
tal content of his spiritual being. If this were not 
the case, there would never have been Councils of the 
Church with their definitions, because a new age would 
always have been able to live on in the old clarity; or 
we should have to suppose that the ~~ reason for these 
Councils was the fact that there had been evil heretics 
who maliciously obscured what in itself had been said 
with quite sufficient clarity and what in itself would 
have been quite sufficient for later ages in spite of 
their unlikeness. 176 
It is up to man in the present day to attempt to 
grasp God's revelation with his own contemporary existential 
vitality. Not to do so betrays the truth. We must attempt 
to both preserve and to change. If we do not preserve, we 
run the risk of falling into doctrinal error. If we fail to 
177 
change, we fail to make God's truth our own. 
176Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," 
Theological Investigations vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), p. 153. 
177Karl Rahner, ' 1The Development of Dogma," p. 45. 
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Some may regard the idea of doctrinal development 
with fear that some of God's truth may be lost if any change 
in doctrine is allowed. Rahner would disagree with this po-
sit ion • 
• a 'development of dogma' • need not entail any 
impoverishment of the life of faith in the Church, or 
any ossification of her awareness of her own faith. This 
life of faith is simply concentrated all the more clearly 
upon the ultimately decisive points contained in the 
Christian faith, and in the contemporary intellectual si-
tuation in the world there is every occasion for this 
concentration. And these most central and most radical 
points in the content of the Christian faith will be con-
sidered, interpreted, and applied to the present by theo-
logies which are, and which will continue to be, very 
different in character. 178 
The Christian should have no fear when facing the 
179 
possibility of doctrinal development~ but should rejoice. 
Rahner sees in this process of development the possibility 
of an enriched understanding on the part of the Church. 
• under certain circumstances certain conceptual mo~ 
dels, or perhaps even errors which have crept into our 
understanding at an earlier stage are gradually elimina-
ted in this process. The ultimate goal of the process 
itself is not that in this way we shall gradually argue 
away the very substance of the dogma itself, so as to 
leave no room for it in our world~ but rather that from 
its own true and innermost centre an ever better under-
standing may be achieved of what it truly signifies. 180 
178Karl Rahner, "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity 
of the Creed in the Church," p. 20. 
179 Karl Rahner, The Christian of the Future, p. 36. 
180Karl Rahner, "The Position of Christology in the 
Church Between Exegesis and Dogmatics," p. 209. 
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The fact that revelation springs from an immutable 
God is not seen as a barrier to change. Rather it provides 
the very possibility of change, since God in his relations 
with the world is the dynamism of change • 
• • the most general relation between God and a muta-
ble world consists in the fact that God as most immanent-
and yet precisely for that reason absolutely superior to 
the world-confers on finite beings themselves a true ac-
tive self-transcendence in their change and becoming, 
and is himself ultimately the future, the final cause, 
which represents the true and really effective cause op-
erative in all change. 181 
It is God's gift of self-transcendence that allows 
man to open up to divine revelation, thus providing an inner 
principle of doctrinal development. 
The closing of revelation is not the arbitrary ending of 
God's speaking, which could have gone on and only as a 
matter of fact fell silent after some chosen utterance • 
• It is man's being opened up for and into the real 
and not merely conceptual self-communication of God. 
And therein it has within itself, precisely because of 
this closure, which is dis-closure, its dynamism of the 
development of dogma. 182 
Having established that dogma does and in fact, must, 
develop we will now examine some specific mechanisms which 
Rahner feels contribute to dogmatic development. 
Rahner uses various explanations to show how doctrine 
can develop while essentially remaining the same. These mech-
anisrus for development of dogma are found throughout his 
181Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger, Revelation and 
Tradition, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), p. 12. 
182 Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 9. 
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writings and no where does he attempt to tie all of them to-
gether into a comprehensive system. This author has attemp-
ted to collect the various mechanisms which Rahner offers 
and to present them in an orderly manner. This has resulted 
in the creation of four broad categories of mechanism for 
dogmatic development. These categories will be presented be-
low. 
The first mechanism which Rahner proposes for under-
standing the relationship between developing dogma and the 
permanence of Christian truth involves the thought that such 
a truth can only be understood in relation to the whole fab-
ric of truths which make up the Christian faith. 
The faith which we believe and live is not a collection 
of propositions arbitrarily brought together, a collec-
tion which is held together only by an abstract, formal 
authority of the revealing God; rather, these truths to-
gether really form an inner unity, they belong together, 
each refers to the other, and the faith in any one of 
them is always merely faith in one aspect of the one 
truth, and is always possible only in the one totality 
which is comprehended in its historical development 
through the ages by the one living consciousness of 
faith of the individual and of the whole Church. 183 
By examining how a truth derives its life, meaning 
and content from the whole of Christian faith through sue-
ceeding ages, it is easier for us to comprehend its signifi-
184 
cance in relation to this whole. It is this framework 
183 Karl Rahner, "Scripture and Tradition," p. 111. 
184Karl Rahner, "The Immaculate Conception," p. 202. 
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which enables us to understand an apparent change in a par-
185 
ticular truth. Because of the relation of each truth to 
the whole body of truths a change or development in a single 
truth, which may not seem to be consistent with previous 
teaching when viewed by itself, might be seen as a natural 
development when such a change is viewed against the back-
ground of the entire body of Catholic doctrine. 
The true meaning of an individual proposition of revealed 
truth does indeed contain an 'item' of new knowledge, 
which is added on to the other truths, enlarges and com-
pletes them; yet a proposition of this kind is in itself 
only really intelligible in the totality of the one sav-
ing Truth. 186 
In addition to this, the development of a particular 
dogma may shed new light on the entire field of doctrines as 
the relation between this new development and Catholic teach-
ing is worked out and viewed for consistency. Old insights 
can be challenged as the development of a particular dogma 
introduces new questions and new perspectives on Catholic 
187 
teaching as a whole. 
One truth known points to another, trains comprehension 
of yet another, gives an understanding of the meaning 
and spirit of the whole and so makes it possible to 
185Karl Rahner, "The Historicity of Theology," Theo-
logical Investigations vol. 9, trans. Graham Harrison (New 
York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 68. 
186Karl Rahner, "The Interpretation of the Dogma of 
the Assumption, 11 Theological Investigations vol. 1, trans. 
Cornelius Ernst (]aLtlmore: Helicon Press, 1961), p. 216. 
187Karl Rahner, "The Historicity of Theology," p. 67. 
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grasp another part. Every question that is raised by one 
truth known leads immediately beyond the particular re-
ality to the whole. 188 
Another mechanism of doctrinal development is that 
the Church knows what it wants to say in some unformulated 
and universal way and that this primal knowledge is simply 
rephrased in different ways and at different times as parts 
of the faith come into greater consciousness within the 
Church. 189 Rahner appeals to a global understanding of 
Christian faith which the Church carries through history 
and which only gradually moves into reflexive consciousness. 
The Church as a whole considers a thought which grows 
out of the whole content of its faith: it ripens, it 
merges ever more fully with the whole, while the Church 
lives it and perfects it. And so the Church of a cer-
tain day, if we say so, finds itself simply there, be-
lieving in this specific manner. 190 
These truths become reflexively conscious through 
the application of thought, in faith, to them within the 
stresses and challenges of our historical situation. 
The history of theology is by no means just the history 
of the progress of doctrine, but also a history of for-
getting. • What was once given in history and is 
ever made present anew does not primarily form a set of 
premises from which we can draw new conclusions which 
have never been thought of before. It is the object 
188 Karl Rahner, On Heresy, p. 35. 
189 Karl Rahner, "Heresies in the Church Today?," 
Theological Investigations vol. 12, trans. David Bourke 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 140-41. 
19
°Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 32. 
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which, while it is always retained, must ever be acquired 
anew, bv us, that is, we who are just such as no one else 
can eve~ ~; in all history. 191 
According to this theory, the Church today would have 
more faith "data" available to her in a reflexive way than 
did, perhaps, the early Church. Rahner denies that our faith 
is therefore somehow better than theirs • 
• in actual fact (if not in essential principle) 
greater reflexive articulation of a spiritual possession 
is nearly always purchased at the cost of a partial lose 
in unhampered communication ('naive' in the good sense) 
with the reality given in faith (and which is still pos-
sessed in its entirety). 192 
The reason that the Church must come to greater re-
flexive consciousness of her faith is that revelation can be 
expressed only imperfectly in a human Church, even one which 
has been promised the help of the Spirit. This, according 
to Rahner, is the effect of original sin, which still leaves 
193 
its "shadows and scars 11 on the members of Christ's Church. 
This should not be construed to mean that the Church's defi-
nitions of doctrine are somehow false. Rahner proposes that 
each doctrinal statement is valid on its own even though it 
may be formulated imperfectly within a sinful Church. He 
takes great care to protect the legitimacy of existing dogma 
191Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," 
pp. 151-2. 
192Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma, 11 p. 67. 
193Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 87. 
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by asserting that all doctrinal statements are true because, 
despite their limitations, they correspond in some way to 
194 
reality. Therefore they are always binding. 
Rahner's third mechanism views the development of 
dogma as an exp~ication or unfolding of what is already con-
tained in existing dogmas. First, it is necessary to realize 
that truths which are derived from other articles of faith do 
exist as dogma and are not merely theology. 
There are truths of faith which are recognized as such by 
the Church because and as they are referred back to other 
truths of revelation in which they are 'implicitly' con-
tained. Any development of dogma which is more than ~ust 
history of theology would otherwise be impossible. 19 
This does not mean that doctrine itself is mutable or 
that the substance of faith is changing. Doctrine cannot be 
abolished, but it can move forward toward the ultimate full-
196 
ness of its own meaning. 
Rahner would deny that a dogma derived implicitly 
from a revelation is somehow less of a revelation in itself. 
He feels that God is not communicating in a somehow inferior 
way but is simply communicating differently. This potential 
for implicit communication is derived from the fact that the 
object communicated far surpasses any utterance of its re-
ality. 197 
194Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 43. 
195Karl Rahner, "Theology in the New Testament," P• 25. 
196Karl Rahner, The Christian of the Future, p. 24. 
197Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 25. 
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The content of a doctrinal statement points to the 
mystery of God. It is this mystery that provides a unity 
for the statement which is not simply achieved by the word 
198 
alone. Because dogmatic statements are statements about 
a reality which defies expression by its very nature, a dyna-
mism is created between what is said and what was intended • 
• it is just because dogmas are human statements 
about the word of God that their character and inner 
tension become more apparent. If dogmas, as human in-
sights, also possess 'intellectual' character, they 
still cannot be totally and evidently known, because 
in their content they refer to something which is of 
an origin that is historical and above all, superna-
tural and mysterious. 199 
All statements about God are by nature analogous, 
approaching the reality which they wish to express but never 
quite expressing the thing itself in its totality. This is 
200 
true of both the dogmatic and of the theological statement. 
This dynamism of expression between a reality that is beyond 
linguistic expression and attempts to express this reality, 
is evident even in the apostles' experience of Jesus and 
their attempts to convey that experience to others. 
Christ, as the living link between God and the world 
••• is the objective content of an experience which 
is more elemental and concentrated, simpler and yet 
198Karl Rahner, "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity 
of the Creed in the Church," p. 21. 
199Karl Rahner, Kerygma and Dogma, p. 41. 
200 Ibid., p. 98. 
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richer than the individual propositions coined in an at-
tempt to express this experience-an attempt which can in 
principle never be finally successful.201 
This richness or plenitude, which is a characteristic 
of the personal experience of Christ and of the experience of 
all revelation, is the basis for thinking that revelation is 
an inexhaustible source of knowledge. 
That revelation has been closed is a positive and not a 
negative statement, a pure Amen, a conclusion which in-
cludes everything and excludes nothing of the divine plen-
itude, conclusion as a fulfilled presence of an all-em-
bracing plentitude. 202 
Because of this each doctrinal assertion can only 
lead to more assertions about the infinite reality which it 
attempts to express . 
. since each truth is in this way a moment of this 
movement towards the unifying self-communication of God, 
which is absolutely unified and utterly intensive, the 
assertion can only function when it is open to more than 
it contains, to the whole, in fact. But it is only open 
• if it unfolds itself in a greater fullness of as-
sertions, through which it is referred ever more fully 
to revelation as a whole. 203 
Such movement within the whole of revelation may open 
revelation itself up for fresh insights and new outlooks • 
• because our statements about the infinite divine 
realities are finite and hence in this sense inadequate-
that is, while actually corresponding to reality, yet not 
201 Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 65. 
202 4 Ibid., p. 9. 
203 Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 25. 
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simply congruent with it-so every formula in which the 
faith is expressed can in principle be surpassed while 
still retaining its truth. • it can be replaced by 
another which states the same thing, and what is more 
states it not only without excluding more extensive, more 
delicately nuanced prospects, but positively opening them 
up: prospects on to facts, realities, truths, which had 
not been -seen explicitly in the earlier formulation and 
which make it possible to see the same reality from a new 
point of v~ew, in a fresh perspective. 204 
The knowledge which an explication brings does not 
need to be provable in a strictly logical manner. It must 
be viewed in the light of Christian faith. When doctrinal 
developments are viewed within this light of faith a sure 
knowledge of the correctness of the development can be ob-
tained, "through the luminous power of the Spirit in con-
205 
tact with the res itself." 
There are two dynamisms at work within explication 
of dogma: expansion and simplification. Rahner feels that 
simplification may be the most important. 
It is not at all as if dogmatic development must always 
move in the direction of multiplying individual asser-
tions. Just as important, indeed, strictly speaking 
still more important, is the development in the line of 
simplification, towards an ever clearer view of what is 
really intended, towards the single mystery, an intensi-
fication of the experience in faith of what is 2 bgfinitely 
simple and in a very essential sense obvious. 
204 Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 44. 
205 Ibid., pp. 52-3. 
206 Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 26. 
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The more often the ultimate themes of revelation are 
disentangled from the various assertions of doctrine the more 
clearly the validity of the individual assertions can be 
207 grasped, and the more dogmatic development occurs. An 
explication of a doctrinal principle can in turn be both less 
and more than the original revelation. It is more because a 
reflexive formulation of the original, simple possession of 
the reality can illuminate and enrich it. Less, because it 
can only be a remote and reflexive expression of what was 
208 before a spiritual possession. 
Rahner makes some distinctions between the types of 
explication which are possible and gives his opinion as to 
which are valid. One type is, 
When the explication is that of a si~le proposition 
contained in original Revelation, and when this explica-
tion only states more expressly {'in other words', in a 
different conceptual language etc.) 'the same thing' as 
the original proposition (of course with the guarantee 
of the magisterium, that the new proposition correctly 
renders the sense of the old), there can be no doubt 
that the new proposition too states what God has re-
vealed, that it is believed with divine faith as mater-
ially God himself, that it is 'dogma' and not just theo-
logy. 209 
A second type of explication is the explication of 
content which is "virtually implicit" in one proposition 
207rbid. 
20 8Karl Rahner, ':The Development of Dogma," p. 6 7. 
209rbid., pp. 57-8. 
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using the help of another proposition to aid in explication. 210 
There is some disagreement among theologians about the valid-
ity of this second type of explication. 
One group, the majority today, hold that these inferred 
proposit~ons are purely human ones, the correctness of 
which can of course be guaranteed by the Church. The 
others believe that this kind of explication of what is 
contained merely 'virtually' in the immediate proposi-
tions of Revelation can and must still really be called 
'Revelation', and as such can be proclaimed by the Church 
as the object of divine faith in the strict sense. The 
second view would seem more correct. 211 
Rahner views the fact that there are some existant 
propositions of faith which fall into this second category 
of explication as proof that this form of explication is 
valid. The magisterium under the guidance of the Spirit can~ 
212 
not rule falsely about a matter of binding faith. Rahner 
sums up his theory of types of explication by saying that, 
• the connection between the original propositions 
and those reached in consequence of dogmatic development 
can consist in the connection between something formally 
or virtually implicit in a proposition and the explica-
tion of this by logical procedures with the support and 
in the light of the divine Spirit, leaving it open as to 
whether or not this connection must be logically compel-
ling in every case 'quoad nos'. 213 
When a Christian pays heed to God speaking through 
the dynamism of an explicated revelation he can believe it 
210 Ibid., p. 58. 
211Ibid., P· 59· 
212 ibid., p. 60. 
213 Ibid., p. 63. 
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as if this were the original utterance itself. Rahner 
appeals to Christians to have faith in God as he uses the 
dynamic mechanisms which are present even in purely human 
speech to reveal himself to man • 
• the God who speaks surveys in himself from the 
very beginning all the virtualities of his speech, and 
by his own Spirit in the Church inspires, guides and 
watches over their very actualization; and ••• from 
the point of view of men and their properly human words 
and propositions, even in human speech more is actually 
communicated formally then can formally be stated. 215 
Related to explication as a mechanism of dogmatic 
development is Rahner's idea of a development actually being 
contained within a doctrine by being co-defined, co-expressed 
or compresent. Rahner prefers these terms to the phrase "im-
216 
plicitly defined." A dogma can have development of this 
type and can still remain within the sphere of what is re-
vealed. 
The immediately intelligible and express statements of 
Revelation in its manifold variety (proposition series 
A) are heard and questioned with a view to discovering 
what is compresent to mind and com-municated by them, 
that is, their background and the principle which com-
prehends the whole of this variety and gives it unity. 
The basic idea compresent to mind and con-signified 
(mit-gesagte) is extracted by making use of the indivi-
dual propositions to give a view of the res on which 
they are based: in this way the basic idea-is formula-
ted in propositions (proposition B). It is only from 
214 Ibid., p. 72-3. 
215 Ibid., p. 74. 
216 Karl Rahner, "Theological Reflexion on Monogenism." 
Theological Investigations vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), p. 242. 
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this intermediate proposition B that the desired termi-
nal proposition is deduced, i.e. recognized as con-sig-
nified. 217 
In his various writings Rahner sets forth certain 
conditions for establishing whether or not a truth is com-
present. This is necessary because we cannot be sure that 
we truly know the mind of someone else when that person is 
no longer available to confirm or deny the accuracy of our 
inferences. 
It may be said, conversely, that something is co-defined 
(mitdefiniert); which although it is not directly inten-
ded by the definer, as properly speaking to be defined, 
fulfills the two following conditions. Firstly, it must 
have been certainly compresent to the definer's mind 
(mitgedacht); and secondly, which is more important, it 
must stand in so immediate, so immediately evident and 
indissoluble a connexion with the proper and direct mat-
ter of the definition, that it is impossible in fact or 
in thought that it too should not bear the whole weight 
of the affirmation given to the proper content of the 
definition. If this is not the case, i.e. if the con-
nexion between what was compresent to mind and what was 
properly intended by the definition is not seen quite 
directly and quite explicitly as such, although it is 
quite objectively given and even demonstrable, then what 
was compresent to mind cannot be spoken of as defined. 2 1 8 
The last of Rahner's mechanisms of d2velopment which 
we will discuss is the idea that the object of a dogmatic 
statement is the principle by which that same statement is 
understood. God not only speaks to man, but within the 
mechanisms of the Spirit, as the Spirit works in mankind, 
God also becomes the hearer of his own utterance. 
217 Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 73. 
218Karl Rahner, "Theological Reflexion on Monogenism," 
p. 242. 
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A divine utterance which is divine by reason of its own 
nature has no meaning unless it is directed toward a 
divine hearing. Part therefore of the divine revelation 
is the Holy Spirit, as the strictly supernatural self-
communication of God. He does not enter in merely as 
the guarantee of its correctness or as the originator of 
a process of efficient causality on the part of God which 
takes place ~ ~ in the region of the finite. He is 
there as the thing uttered itself and only with this can 
the human utterance be the self-utterance of God. Here 
we have at once the infinite openness of self-develop-
ment, whose only limits are in the visio beatifica it-
self. 219 
The spirit performs this action through the "believ-
ing consciousness of the Church." Through its harboring of 
the Spirit, the Church becomes the bearer of doctrinal de-
220 
velopment. The Spirit as part of the Trinity, is the 
reality which is believed in, therefore the object of faith 
is not passive but is involved as a dynamic principle by 
221 
which it itself is grasped • 
• the formal a priori of faith, in contrast to the 
natural transcendence of the spirit and its a priori re-
lationship, is not a formal abstract a priori, founded 
on the potentiality of the developing spirit and its 
openness; it is not merely an a priori of possibility. 
It is in fact the real intensive fullness of what is 
meant in each individual object of faith, and that not 
merely in notion or idea, but in the· reality itself, 
which is none other than the triune God in his real 
self-communication. 222 
219 Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," p. 12. 
220 rbid., p. 14. 
221Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 51. 
22 2Kar 1 Raimer, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," pp. 25-6. 
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In our discussion of the mechanisms of the develop-
ment of dogma Rahner has attributed the dynamics of doctri-
nal development to many elements. However. he emphasizes 
that revelation develops as a complex whole. 
Dogma, or a dogma, is a unified entity which is construc-
ted of varibus elements. • If dogma or a dogma de-
velops all the elements which go to build up such a dog-
ma necessarily develop also. This is only possible how-
ever if a dynamic tendency to develop is innate in each 
of these constitutive elements themselves. We recognize 
of course also at the same time that the dynamic tenden-
cies of each of these elements can only be effective in 
the totality and must remain dependent on the unfolding 
of the whole. • Any theory of the development of dog-
ma which disregards or denies this simple fact and would 
for instance try to attribute the development of dogma 
as such merely to the magisterium or to the inspiration 
of the Spirit or to the logical explication of the vir-
tualities impli;d in the human assertion, is to be dis-
carded at once as false. 223 
We will conclude by examining criteria for doctrinal 
development which may be found in Rahner's writings. There 
appears to be a development in thought between ideas which 
Rahner has proposed in two different articles. First I will 
present the theory of the possibility of developmental cri-
teria which is given in Rahner's article "The Development of 
Dogma" in Volume I of Theological Investigations. 
Let us suppose that in the development of the doctrine 
of the Assumption, for example, forms and properties of 
the development of dogma become apparent which cannot be 
demonstrated with the same clarity in other phases or 
sectors of this development; these properties may even 
be clearly of a kind which do not harmonize with the ac-
counts of development given in the ordinary theological 
treatment (not of course in the authoritative pronounce-
223 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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ments of the Church). Yet this would not indicate any 
false development here •.• at most it would be a sign 
that the scheme proposed in the average treatment re-
quires to be improved, qualified or enlarged. 224 
If this is true, then theological laws which are de-
duced from studies of dogmatic development may not apply to 
all cases • 
• laws certainly exist which may be observed in a 
section of this total process, and which can .then be ap-
plied to other (later) phases and partial developments. 
The perfected law of dogmatic development however may 
only be laid down when the whole unique process has 
reached its term. And because it is a genuinely histori-
cal process, under the impulse of the Spirit of God, who 
never makes himself accessible without remainder to laws 
which can be grasped by human minds, it is never just the 
working out of a formula and an all-embracing law. It 
is manifestly erroneous a priori to attempt to construct 
an adequate formula of this kind and by this means to mas-
ter the single sense of this process and combat possible 
'd~viations' as false developments. 225 
Rahner does give some guidelines on how to grapple 
with the problem of recognizing false dogmatic development. 
Certain laws can be applied a priori "in an obvious way- and 
certainly with prudence 11 but they can be applied only by the 
Church and not by the individual. Secondly, development will 
become slower as truth becomes clearer and more full. With 
greater clarity comes more "strictness" which in turn more 
completely precludes the possibility of errors occurring in 
doctrinal formulations. And lastly, and most significantly, 
Rahner proposes that "the danger of the human factor simply 
224Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," p. 42. 
225 Ibid., pp. 41-2. 
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remains a danger and no precautionary measures exist which 
can exclude it unambiguously at the very start." Because of 
this Rahner goes back to Christ's promise that he would never 
allow his Church to fall into errors of belief. It is only 
this promise of the presence of the Spirit within the Church 
which prevents the potential danger of human error in the 
226 
formulation of doctrine from becoming a reality. 
Rahner again emphasizes that it is in the authority, 
based on the promise of Christ to his Church, of the magis-
terium which finally gives the validity to dogmatic state-
ments. 
• it is superfluous and injurious to the honesty 
which is one of the virtues of theology, to attempt at 
all costs to produce a logically stringent argument of 
a reflexive kind from the sources of faith for every 
doctrine of faith to which there is firm testimony in 
the magisterium of the Church. The theologian should 
try to find such an argument. . But even where he 
is unable to find an argument which is honestly justi-
fied by the facts, he should avoid giving the appear-
ance of supposing that his own mind and his own theo-
logical reflexions are simply the point at which the 
Holy Spirit of the Church has achieved its fullest man-
ifestation. 227 
Dogmatic development is a "spiritual process" which 
continues to work even when theologians have not yet devel-
oped a satisfactory understanding of the objective and sub-
jective presuppositions upon which this developmental pro-
226 Ibid., 42 3 PP • - • 
227 Ibid., 54 5 pp. - • 
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cess is resting. The reason is that the motivating force 
within doctrinal development, and which guarantees its va-
lidity, is not simply identified with formal logic. 229 Ra-
ther, this motivating force operates within the "plentitude 
230 
of revealed reality.'' In his work On Heresy, Rahner 
writes that 
• the development of the Church's awareness of her 
faith has gradually made the criterion of faith in its 
strictly formal, juridical rigour itself an object of 
faith. With the definition of the infallibility of the 
supreme teaching authority of the pope, this development 
has reached a certain finality. Consequently, it is no 
longer as possible as it was in earlier days for there 
to be doubt or uncertainty whether some explicit doc-
trine is or is not in accordance with the Church's be-
lief. 231 
Rahner presents a shift of emphasis in this view-
point in the article, "Considerations on the Development of 
Dogma" in Theological Investigations IV. Rahner here makes 
the assertion that perhaps some principles can validly be 
applied to doctrinal development. He is still cautious in 
applying principles of development to already existing dog-
mas but at least opens the possibility ~or such an applica-
tion. 
In the last resort, the development of dogma is not a 
single process which can be adequately comprehended by 
formal laws. • • The unfolding of divine revelation 
228 Ibid., p. 56. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231Karl Rahner, On Heresy, p. 49. 
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is a process. As a process through which the divine reve-
lation passes it is unique. Therefore it has no a priori 
categories, distinct from itself and superior to itself 
and likewise adequately determining it. Unlike the pro-
cesses of natural science, it cannot be comprised under 
such formal laws as would enable us to predict properly 
any later phase. • We cannot therefore demand that 
the development of one dogma will conform adequately to 
the laws of another and so for instance challenge the 
legitimacy of a given development by appealing to the 
contrast in another. • But in saying this we do not 
of course deny that there are certain formal principles 
with regard to this development, which follow from the 
nature of a historical and final revelation, just as 
much as does the principle enunciated above. Such prin-
ciples may give rise to justifiable ob1ections to pos-
sible wrong developments in theology. 232 
232 Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development 
of Dogma," pp. 7-8. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
We end this paper presenting two cautious theories 
of criteria for dogmatic development. At the very least 
Rahner seems hesitant to use his broad categories of develop-
mental mechanisms as criteria for judging dogma. In doing 
so Rahner remains true to the Catholic idea of authority of 
the magisterium in all decisions regarding doctrine. 
However, the real value of Rahner's work regarding 
dogma has very little to do with establishing criteria for 
judging doctrine. Rahner has presented us with a coherent 
system of thought which, beginning with his ontology and 
anthropology, allows us to make a systematic progression 
from man's ability to hear revelation and God's ability to 
reveal himself to doctrine, its relation to revelation and 
inherent aspects which allow and generate dogmatic develop-
ment. His four categories of mechanisms for dogmatic devel-
opment may serve as organizing principles for the study of 
specific dogmas and their histories. This in itself is 
quite an accomplishment. And although ideas on these sub-
jects are scattered throughout Rahner's works, they remain 
available to theologians who wish to avail themselves of 
the ability to study progressive, systematic thought orien-
80 
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ted to the future while based on time-honored Thomistic prin-
ciples of philosophy and theology. 
It is hoped that this paper, by gathering these ideas 
and presenting them in a somewhat systematic manner, has fa-
cilitated the reader's appreciation of the scope of Rahner's 
thought and perhaps stimulated further inquiry into its ap-
plication in the fields of dogma and dogmatic development. 
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